Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2001

Nana G. Penrose v. Christopher Ross : Brief of
Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Michael W. Wright; Attorneys for Appellee.
Scott N Cunningham; Attorney for Appellant.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Nana G. Penrose v. Christopher Ross, No. 20010943 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2001).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/3568

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Nana G. Penrose,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,

Appellate Case No. 20010943 CA

v.

Priority Classification No. 15

Christopher Ross, An Individual,
Bryant Ross, An Individual (Formerly :
identified as DOE 1), DOES 2-5
Inclusive, Whose True Names Are
Not Known to Plaintiff,
Defendants/Appellees.
:

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Appealfromthe Order Granting Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary
Judgment of the THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, Salt Lake Department, the Honorable Jr.dge Leon A. Dever presiding.

Scott N. Cunningham (USB #6084)
Attorney for Appellant
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)364-1663
Michael W. Wright
Attorney for Appellee
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801)466-4228

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

Naoa G. Penrose,
Plaintiff/ Appellant,

Appellate Case No. 20010943 CA

v.

Priority Classification No. 15

Christopher Ross, An Individual,
Bryant Ross, An Individual (Formerly :
identified as DOE 1), DOES 2-5
Inclusive, Whose True Names Are
Not Known to Plaintiff,
Defendants/Appellees.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE
COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

Appealfromthe Order Granting Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary
Judgment of the THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY,
STATE OF UTAH, Salt Lake Department, the Honorable Judge Leon A. Dever presiding.

Scott N. Cunningham (USB #6084)
Attorney for Appellant
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
(801)364-1663
Michael W. Wright
Attorney for Appellee
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801)466-4228

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iii

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

I

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW & STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

CONTROLLING STATUTES

2

.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

........

.....

.........

3

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

6

ARGUMENT

8
i

POINTI
PLAINTDTF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD RELATE BACK TO THE
DATE OF THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT BASED UPON
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 15(c)'s "RELATION BACK"
DOCTRINE AND THE "IDENTITY OF INTEREST" EXCEPTION
RECOGNIZED IN UTAH CASE LAW

8

POINT II

,

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
MAKE ANY FINDINGS OF FACTS WHATSOEVER REGARDING THE
"IDENTITY OF ESTEREST"EXCEPTION.
11
<

CONCLUSION

11

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

13

ADDENDA:

*

A

Plaintiffs Original Verified Complaint for Negligence and Jury Demand

A

B

Summons on Return of Service for Defendant Christopher Ross

B

-i-

<

C

Affidavit of Nana Penrose in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment

C

Plaintiff's First Amended Verified Complaint for Negligence and Demand
for Jury Trial

D

First Amended Summons, Return of Service for Defendants Christopher
and Bryant Ross

E

Defendant Bryant Ross5 Motion for Summary Judgment & Memorandum
in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment

F

Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Opposition to Defendant
Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary Judgment

G

Plaintiffs Request for Hearing on Defendant Bryant Ross5 Motion for
Summary Judgment

H

Plaintiffs Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Response to Defendant
Bryant Ross5 Reply Memorandum In Support of Motion for Summary
Judgment

I

Minute Entry / Disposition Summary on Defendant Bryant Ross5 Motion
for Summary Judgment

J

Plaintiffs Objection to Proposed Order Granting Defendant Bryant Ross5
Motion for summary Judgment

K

L

Order Granting Defendant Bryant Ross5 Motion for Summary Judgment....

L

M

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15(c)

M

D

E

F

G

H

I

J
K

-ii-

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES CITED
Doxev-Lavton Co. v. Clark. 548 P.2d 902. 906 (Utah 1976)

8,9

Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289,259 P.2d 297 (1953)

2

Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah 1991)

2

Neiderhauser Bldrs.& Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d 1193 (Utah Ct. App. 1992)

2

Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co.. 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984)

9

Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995)

8,9

Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 979 P.2d 332
(Utah 1999)
Sulzen v. Williams. 977 P.2d 497

9

Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp.. 911 P.2d 367. 369 (Utah 1996)

8,9

STATUTORY PROVISIONS
URCP Rule 15(c)

8
PRIOR OR RELATED APPEALS

There have been no prior or related appeals.

<

-iii-

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-2a-3(2Xj). This is an appeal from an Order Granting Defendant's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 15 (Amended and Supplemental pleadings)
sets forth in Subsection (c) that
"Relation back ofamendments. Whenever the claim or defense
asserted in the amended pleading arose out of the conduct,
transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the
original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the
original pleading"
Normally, however, the rule does not apply to a party added by later
amendment. An exceptions exists under Utah Case Law which does cause a
relation back in the case of a party added by amendment where an "identity
of interest" exists between the original defendant and the added party.
"Identity of interest" is defined in the case law as meaning that notice to the
original defendant serves as notice to the added party so it can be assumed
that relation back is not prejudicial, and that the real party in interest was
sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or was involved in them unofficially
Appellant's Brief-Page No. 1

from an early stage.

Does plaintifl7appellant's First Amended Complaint naming Bryant
Ross as a defendant relate back in time to the date of the filing of the
original complaint under the "identity of interest" exception
recognized under Utah Law ?
i

On review of a summary judgment motion, the party against whom the
judgment has been granted is entitled to have all the facts presented , and all
the inferences fairly arising therefrom, considered in a light most favorable

(

to him. Morris v. Farnsworth Motel, 123 Utah 289,259 R2d 297 (1953),
Mountain States Tel & Tel. Co. v. Garfield County, 811 P.2d 184 (Utah

{

1991).
The appellate court reviews the trial court's conclusions of law for
correctness, including its conclusion that there are no material fact issues.
Springville Citizens for a Better Community v. City of Springville, 979 P.2d
332 (Utah 1999), Neiderhauser Bldrs.& Dev. Corp. v. Campbell, 824 P.2d

(

1193 (Utah Ct.App. 1992).
CONTROLLING STATUTES
1.

<

URCP Rule 15(c) - Regarding Amended and Supplemental Proceedings. Relation
back ofamendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended
I
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pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted
to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of
the original pleading.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the case - This is an appealfroman Order Granting Defendant's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
Course of Proceedings:
L

This case arises out of an automobile accident involving plaintiff which
occurred in Salt Lake City, Utah on November 26,1996. (Verified
Complaint, attached as Addendum A).

2.

On the date plaintiff filed her original Verified Complaint herein
(hereinafter "original complaint"), November 17,2001, plaintiff did not
know the name of the individual Bryant Ross. (Original Complaint,
attached as Addendum A; Affidavit of Nana G. Penrose in Support of
Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter "plaintiffs
affidavit", attached as Addendum C). In addition to Christopher Ross,
plaintiff sued persons whose true identities were unknown to her under the
fictitious names of DOES 1-5, and stated that those persons, along with
Christopher Ross were negligently responsible for her injuries and damages.
This was done in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9
Appellant's Brief- Page No. 3

(a)(2). (Original Complaint; Addendum A).
3.

Plaintiff had never received a copy of the Police Report regarding the
accident until defendant's counsel provided it to plaintiffs counsel in
January, 2001. (Affidavit of Nana G. Penrose in Support of Opposition to
Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter "plaintiffs affidavit",
Addendum C). Because plaintiff did not know Bryant Ross' name, attempts
to obtain a copy of the accident report from the police department by
plaintiffs counsel were unsuccessful. (PlaintiflTs Affidavit; Addendum C).

4.

Plaintiff gave a recorded statement regarding the accident in April, 1997,
but never received a copy of that statement. (PlaintiflTs Affidavit;
Addendum C) Although the person taking the statement apparently
mentioned the name Bryant Ross during that interview, his name was
mentioned only once in passing along with other information about the
accident, and plaintiff did not remember it some three and one half years
later when she signed her original complaint. (PlaintiflTs Complaint,
attached as Addendum A; PlaintiflTs Affidavit; Addendum C)

5;

The only name plaintiff knew of regarding the accident at the time she
signed her original complaint was Christopher Ross, whose name she knew
because it was set forth in a 1997 letterfroman insurance company, in
which Christopher Ross was the only person listed as "our insured".
Appellant's Brief - Page No. 4

(Plaintiff's Affidavit, exhibit A thereto; Addendum C).
6.

Following service of plaintiffs original complaint upon Christopher Ross,
on December 18,2000, plaintiffs counsel received a recorded telephone
messagefromdefendant Christopher Ross saying that it was his son Bryant
Ross who was involved in the accident. On January 2,2001, plaintiff filed
her First Amended Verified Complaint which was amended to add the name
of Bryant Ross in place of fictitious name DOE 1. (Plaintiffs First
Amended Verified Complaint, hereinafter Amended Complaint, attached
hereto as Addendum D).

7.

Defendants Bryant Ross and Christopher Ross were both served with the
Amended Complaint at the Ross' home on January 8,2001. (Return of
Service, attached hereto as Addendum E) On January 22,2001, Defendants
Rossfiledtheir Answer to the Amended Complaint.

IL

The parties thereafter made their Initial Disclosures and the Stipulated
Discovery Plan and upon which an Order was been signed and entered.

9.

On May 9,2001, Defendant Bryant Rossfiledhis Motion for Summary
Judgment arguing that the statute of limitations had expired prior to the
filing of Plaintiff's Amended Complaint which amended the original
complaint to name Bryant Ross as the negligent driver who struck plaintiff
and injured her and totalled her vehicle. (See Addendum F).
Appellant's Brief- Page No. 5

10.

On May 18,2001 Plaintiff filed her Memorandum of Points and Authorities
in Opposition to Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary Judgment
and Request for Hearing . (See Addendums G & H).

11.

On June 16,2001, Plaintiff filed her Memorandum of Points and
Authorities in Response to Defendant Bryant Ross' Reply Memorandum in
Support of Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Addendum I).

12.

On September 6,2001 the Trial Court made and entered its Minute Entry /
Disposition Summary granting Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for
Summary Judgment. (See Addendum J).

13.

On October 1,2001, Plaintiff filed her Objection to Proposed Order
Granting Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary Judgment. (See
AddendumK).

14.

On October 1,2001, the Trial Court signed and entered the Order Granting
(

Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary Judgment. (See Addenum L).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
While generally URCP, Rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which
substitutes or adds new parties for those brought before the court by the original
pleadings, the Utah Supreme Court has made an exception to the general rule. The
exception operates where there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when
new and old parties have an identity of interest; so that notice to one serves to give notice
i
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d

to the other and it can be assumed or proved that relation back is not prejudicial.
In this case, the party named as the defendant in Plaintiffs original Complaint,
Christopher Ross, is the father of Bryant Ross, who was named as a defendant in
Plaintiff's Amended Complaint which filed some six weeks after the original Complaint
was filed. At the time that the automobile accident which gave rise to this case occurred,
Bryant Ross was under 21 years of age and living at his father's home. Bryant Ross was
insured under Christopher Ross' Insurance policy. Immediately following the accident,
young Bryant Ross was hospitalized, as was Plaintiff (who suffered a broken bone). When
Christopher Ross was later served with the original summons and complaint, he was at his
home. That was the same home where both he and Bryant were served with the Amended
Complaint shortly thereafter. It appears that Bryant Ross still was living at his father's
home. Therefore, it would defy common sense to conclude that upon being served with
the original Complaint regarding the accident that Bryant had caused, that Christopher
Ross would not inform his son of this. After all, Christopher would have known that he
had not caused that accident and would certainly remember his son being involved in an
accident and having been hospitalized. Bryant Ross got notice of the proceedings
following the service of the original Complaint on his father at their home. Additionally,
because Plaintiff's Amended Complaint wasfiledand served only approximately six
weeks after the original, there was no risk of prejudice to Bryant Ross by allowing the
amendment to "relate back" to thefilingdate of the original Complaint. Moreover,
Appellant's Brief - Page No. 7

because both Christopher and Bryant were insured by the same company, with the same
adjusters, investigators and attorneys, the information that those persons began gathering
following the accident, and later service of the original Complaint upon Christopher Ross
was available for use in defending either or both of the Ross's. Therefore, no prejudice
can have resulted by virtue of the amendment "relating back" to the filing date of the
original Complaint
ARGUMENT
Point!
PLAINTIFF'S AMENDED COMPLAINT SHOULD RELATE BACK TO THE
DATE OF THE FILING OF THE ORIGINAL COMPLAINT BASED UPON
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 15(c)'s "RELATION BACK"
DOCTRINE AND THE "IDENTITY OF INTEREST" EXCEPTION
RECOGNIZED IN UTAH CASE LAW
The relation back doctrine is governed by Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 15(c), which provides that "whenever the claim or defense asserted in the
amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or
attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment relates back to the date
of the original pleading" Utah R. Civ. P. 15(c).
While generally Rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or
adds new parties for those brought before the court by the original pleadings, the Utah
Supreme Court has made an exception to the general rule. The exception operates where
there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties have
an identity of interest; so it can be assumed or proved that relation back is not prejudicial.
Appellant's Brief- Page No. 8

In Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996), the Court quoted the
above holding in Doxey-Layton. supra, as setting forth the applicable rule for finding that
an "identity of interest" exists, and that therefore the exception would apply. Wilcox, at
p. 370. Again, the crux of the determination is that the real parties in interest had notice of
the proceedings (and thus were not prejudiced). In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply
Co.. 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984), the Court stated that: "Identity of interest as used in this
context means that the parties are so closely related in their business operations that
notice of the action against one serves to provide notice of the action to the other." Id. at
p. 217. (Emphasis added). In Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995) the
Court again held that the requirement for finding identity of interest is that the parties are
so closely related that notice of the action against one serves to provide notice to the
other. Id. at p. 265. In Sulzen v. Williams, 977 P.2d 497 (Utah App. 1999) the Court of
Appeals quoted Wilcox, supra, which in turn had quoted Doxey-Layton. supra, for the
rule setforthhereinabove in those cases.
The factor that those courts were looking for in each of those cases was notice to
the real party in interest (so that relation back of an amendment was not prejudicial).
In the present case, Christopher Ross, who was served with the original
complaint, is the father of Bryant Ross, who was later served at the same residence
where Christopher Ross was originally served. Moreover, Christopher Ross knew that
he had not been involved in an accident such as was described in Plaintiffs original
Appellant's Brief- Page No. 9

Complaint. And, being that Bryant Ross was apparently seventeen years old at the time of
the accident and was hospitalized following the accident, and given that Bryant Ross was
apparently insured under Christopher Ross9 policy (see Exhibit A to plaintiffs
Declaration previously filed herein), it is entirely reasonable to assume that Christopher
Ross was aware that Bryant Ross had been involved in the accident, and that he informed
Bryant Ross of the Summons and Complaint that Christopher Ross had been served with
at their home. Therefore, not only did Bryant Ross receive notice of plaintiffs action at
that time, but it would have been clear that the action related to the accident that Bryant
had been in.
Bryant Ross "can be reasonably assumed to have been alerted to the proceedings,
or was involved in them unofficially from an early stage." No prejudice will result to
Bryant Ross by the relation back of plaintiff s Amended Complaint to the date of the
original Complaint. Nor has Bryant Ross even made the suggestion that he would be
prejudiced in any way by a relation back of the Amended Complaint. The time
between the filing of the original complaint and the amended complaint was only a little
more than one month. Moreover, Christopher Ross and Bryant Ross are insured by the
same company, and therefore, the evidence gathered by the insurer for each of the
defendants Ross regarding the accident would be the same. Additionally, these
defendants both have the same attorneys, which further demonstrates an identity of
interest preventing prejudice from resulting.
Appellant's Breif - Page No. 10

On the other hand, plaintiff stands to lose her day in court for an adjudication upon the
meri'ts against the young driver who she alleges hit her, causing her to suffer, as plaintiff
has alleged in her verified.pleadings, broken bones, a trip to the hospital, and permanent
injury. It should be noted tl lat the parties hereto liuvi nuuk1 ilini IIIIIKII Disclosuiesdiid
stipiil.Hol hi ,i "illiv"! fivav I'll.iiiii will 11 In 11 ni I"", * ''Mill lias inooi|*oulr'l into „iiil(l *r*h'i
Point II
THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY FAILING TO
MAKE ANY FINDINGS OF FACTS WHATSOEVER REGARDING THE
"IDENTITY OF INTEREST"EXCFPTION
Plamtifl raised the "Identity ol'Interest" eveeptii n iiiuiiiiiciii in npposih m lo
rVlnid^nt Brvuril Ross' Motion loi Suiiiiii.ii \ ludgmenl (Sec Addendums u &. 1).
Plaintiff also requested a hearing on the motion. (See Addendum 11). Although the Trial
Court considered that argument (See Addendum J), the court erred in making no factual
findings regarding the "Identity of Interest" issue, other than to say "no identity of interest
established" (See Addendum J).
"I "'"1 INC 'HISION
PI finlift hud siihinitlnl siiiOlnnit n IIHIHHT (H esl.iblisli lliiil < 'hnslophei Ross .mil
Bryant Ross had an "Identity of Interest" such as has been recognized m the Utah cases
cited above as an exception to the "Relation Back" rule of URCP, Rule 15(c). Fherefore,
Plaintiffs Amended Complaint should have been held to have "related back" to the date
that the original Complaint was filed, prior to the expiration of the statute of limitations,,,.
Appellant's Brief
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. -

.

Certainly, no prejudice could have resulted to Bryant Ross by allowing such an
amendment. Lastly, Plaintiff should have her day in Court against the responsible party
who caused the accident which permanently injured her and which has left her with
unpaid medical bills in the thousands of dollars.

9 <VZ-

DATED this A J

day of June, 2002.

*L*-^ Ut^^fi^^^x'^
^

^Jp'rY*

w

Scott N. Cunningham
Attorney for the Appellant
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

c

1 hereby certify that on June 25,2002,1 personam .
^f the foregoing Brief of Appellant to the following:
Attorney for Defendant/ Appellee:
Michael W. Wright
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake Citv Utah 84106
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ADDENDUM A

A

SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM #6084
211 East 300 South, #216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 364-1633
Attorney for Plaintiff
IN
OI< J-An

,-AKI

COUNTY, SALr: : .M E DEPARTMENT

VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
NEGLIGENCE AND JURY
DEMAND

NANA PENROSE,
Plaintiff,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL,
AND DOES 1-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE
TRUE NAMES ARE NOT KNOWN TO
PLAINTIFF
Defendants.

•

I

Ci II ':
Judge:

i.-J

•-

c ::>: *

attorney, :- • .r *

,

-iqiian.

M, : :wrfc-:-> alleges ninj compla

against the Defendant as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
- :mor r^'^v-v* «-^ * • Ui,

.me; relevaii' *-{
was a resider •

• •

•

^r. defendant Christopher Ross,
't/1* * -f "t^h

r

anH capacities, wl.etnr: .,..:: . . j^,.
I~

. * \;: . u s . v F» t

are

LxiC iiaxiitiii was ^ resident

•.

~'t..-_:-*:.
+

i
^

-

'

* ue names

J; -etenaants DOES
therefore sues said
n l i in '>' in I

i

Procedure, Rules 9(a) (2) and 10, Plaintiff will seek leave to amend
this Complaint to show their true names and capacities when the
same have been ascertained. Plaintiff is informed and believes and
thereon alleges that at all times herein mentioned each of the
defendants were agents, servants and employees of each of the
remaining defendants and in so doing the things hereinafter
mentioned were acting within the course and scope of such agency,
service and employment and in doing the acts herein alleged were
acting with the consent, permission, knowledge and authorization
of each of the remaining defendants. All actions of each such
defendant were ratified and approved by the officers, supervisors,
or managing agents of every other defendant. Plaintiff is informed
and believes, and thereon alleges, that each of the defendants
designated herein as a DOE whose name is unknown is negligently
responsible in some manner for the events and happenings herein
referred to, and negligently caused the injuries and damages to
plaintiff as alleged herein.

(

3. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this litigation
occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The amount in
controversy exceeds $25,000.00, exclusive of costs. Jurisdiction
and venue are proper in this Court.
FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
4.

All of the actions and events (hereinafter referred to as

"the accident11) of which complaint herein is made occurred on the
21st day of November, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the time
2
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issued a traffic citation by the Salt Lake City Police Department
charging him with a violation of applicable traffic laws in
connection with the official investigation of the accident.
Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that Defendant
Christopher Ross was required to pay a court imposed fine as a

(

result of the said traffic violation;
c. He failed to lower his speed according to the existing
and changing traffic conditions, with reckless disregard for the
safety and welfare of others upon the road; and
d. He otherwise drove and operated his automobile
improperly.
10.

The accident which occurred and the injuries which have

resulted to the Plaintiff are the proximate result of the
negligence of Defendant Ross and DOES 1-5, as a result of those

{

events hereinbefore described.
11.

As a proximate result of the Defendants1 negligence, the

Plaintiff was injured. The Plaintiff sustained shock and injury to

(

her brain, central nervous system, and spine, in at least the
following particulars: neck, upper and lower back injuries, both
to her spinal column and to the muscles, tendons and connective

{

tissues, other whiplash-related injuries, and psychological and
emotional damage, and a broken bone in her hand. As a proximate
result of the negligence of Defendants, Plaintiff has sustained

i

severe and continuing bodily injuries, including permanent
impairment, which have caused her great pain and anguish of mind
and body, sleeplessness, nausea, headaches and dizziness, and will
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medical, chiropractic, and massage treatments, and continues to
incur such loss, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount to be
proven at time of trial.
16.

As a further direct and proximate result of the

negligence of the Defendants, Plaintiff has suffered pain,

,

emotional distress, permanent impairment, loss of enjoyment of life
and other general damages in an amount to be proven at time of
\

trial.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)
17.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 16 above.
18.

The negligence of the Defendants proximately caused

,

injuries and damages to Plaintiff as alleged above.
19.

Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff for damages in

such categories and amounts to be proven at trial. Plaintiff should
be awarded such damages as are proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the
Defendants as follows:
1. For general damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
2. For medical and incidental expenses, both past and future,
in an amount to be proven at trial.
3.

For other economic and out-of-pocket damages in an amount

to be proven at trial.
4.

For prejudgment interest on the damages assessed by the
6
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deem,

VERIFICATION UNDER OATH

STATE OF UTAH
County of Salt Lake )

ss.

Nana Penrose, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and
says that she is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and
has read the foregoing VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR NEGLIGENCE and knows
the contents thereof and the same are true of her own knowledge
except as to those matters herein stated upon information and
belief, and as to those matters, she believes them to be true.

DATED

this /7

day of

7UT\>.

'7/l/L*VCu

2000

fsJHA&LuJ

NANA^PENROSE - Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me th

^ytt/ijtei

i.UTH

day of

, 2000.

NOTARY FUBUC
KEVENHOFEUNG
ft 211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
commission Expires
January 29.2002
STATE OF UTAH

NOTARY PUBtitT
Residing at Salt Lake County,
Utah

i

ADDENDUM B

RETURN OF SERVICE

STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
1.
2.

S<^r(j

idkl?

)

I hereby make return of service and certify the following:
I am a person over the age of 21 years, and am not a party to the action.
I served dVviHdpklY
() Other

f<fj

5 defendant ()Plaintiff, () Witness,

Type of Process:
a.
{^Summons and Complaint
b.
( ) Petition to Modify
c.
() Order to Show Cause
d.
(()) Subpoena
(
father: \)l»t fiW tmd*l/?T
4.

t

,
f
fl^ A/M U * £S/J<. / Ju M

"
I served said process by:
a.
^Delivering a cgpy to Said individual personally at

7

6 rv3 fl!i>* Mfa/fflF/s dv'xi/*
.?anlf u^fCf C/ty, Mf#h

5.
6.

v<
() Leaviife a copy with
a person of
c.
suitable age and discretion at the above address for the person being served.
( ) Serving a company or corporation:
by leaving
a
copy
with
whose
title
is
.
Date Received:
Date Served:

Before serving said process, I endorsed the following information in the upper right-hand
Corner of the Summons and showed the original to the person being served:
a
the name of the person being served,
b.
the date the same was served,
c.
the address of service,
d.
my name, and
e.
my signature.
Case No. 4 40*10*1
3*9/
Service Fees:
Hi, &&
I certify that the foregoing is true and correct and that this certificate is executed on the
. day oip^££/77frj£*0
, .>2QP0
Process Server

SubscribedUnd Sworn to before this ( ^ day of

CL.
Notary

.2000

(&' g^g4*A>uXA ^

YV\g QJQXC^
NOTARY PUBLIC
S ":?•'•>: o?- UTAH
My C';n::T;;s^)n frxpires
J»jly1?,20U3

CrNTHIAC.MAESTAS
8295 West 3500 South
Magna, Utah 84044

,
Vi^tfSt

ADDENDUM C

SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM #6084
Attorney for Plaintiff
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 801 364-1663

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY - SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

NANA G. PENROSE,

:

AFFIDAVIT OF PLAINTIFF NANA G.
PENROSE IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION
TO DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

:

Civil No. 000909391

PLAINTIFF,
-vs-

CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL,:
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FORMERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1), DOES :
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF,
DEFENDANTS.

Judge: L.A. DEVER

:

STATE OF UTAH

)
ss:
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE )
NANA G. PENROSE, being first duly sworn and under oath deposes and says as follows:
1.

I am the plaintiff in the above-entitled action.

2.

I am over the age of eighteen, and a resident of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.

3.

At the time I signed my original Verified Complaint herein, if I had known the
name of Bryant Ross and his identity as the actual driver of the vehicle that hit

me, I would certainly have named him as a defendant. When I signed the original
Verified Complaint, I could not have told anyone Bryant Ross' name if my life
depended on it.
4.

On April 2, 1997,1 gave a recorded statement over the telephone to a man from
an insurance company about the accident that is the subject of this lawsuit. He
mentioned the name of the other driver one time during that conversation, at the
same time he asked about the date and location of the accident.

5.

I have never received a copy of the transcript of that interview, and had never
seen it until the present motion was filed with it as an attachment. It had been
over three and one half years since that conversation when I signed my original
Verified Complaint herein. I could not remember Bryant Ross' name, and to tell
the truth, the man taking the statement ran it past me pretty quick at the same
time he was asking about other information.

6.

I had never even seen the police report regarding the accident until it was sent
by defendant's attorney to my attorney as an exhibit to the Affidavit of
Christopher Ross, previously filed herein. My attorney had attempted to obtain a
copy of the police report prior to my signing of my original complaint, but with
just my name and Christopher Ross' name, the police records department could
not locate any record of it. Again, had I known the name of Bryant Ross, I could
have supplied that information to my attorney and then the police would probably
have been able to locate the report.

7.

The only written information regarding any potential defendant that I still had in
my possession and that I could find before signing my original Verified

Complaint herein, was a letter from State Farm Insurance regarding payment for
my medical expenses. It identified only Christopher Ross as their insured. That is
how I knew even his name. A true and correct copy of the letter is attached hereto
as exhibit A.
8.

Again, if I had known Bryant Ross' name, I would have named him as a
defendant in my original complaint.

DATED: 5~ 17

,2001

j.
to^vo^j^v^f'
NANA G. PENROSE

•-A
Subscribed and sworn to before me the undersigned Notary this / / day of May, 2001.

VL H. O'iL

Notary Public
Residing at:

& OoHv fl^jL

(U^X4

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this /&

day of May, 2001,1 mailed a true and correct copy of

the foregoing AFFIDAVIT OF NANA G. PENROSE IN SUPPORT OF OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to:
Michael W. Wright
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

(

<

i

EXHIBIT A
j

STATE FARM

State Farm I n s u r a n c e

Companies
INSURANCE

August 18, 1997

State Farm Insurance Companie
West Valley Service Center
2655 South Lake Erie Drive
P. 0. Box 30463
Salt Lake City, UT 84130
Telephone: (801)956-4000

Ms, Nana Penrose
1632 Princeton Avenue
Salt Lake City, UT 84105

Re:

Claim: 44 1015 121
Our Insured: Christopher Ross
Date of Loss: November 21, 1996

Dear Ms. Penrose:
Per our letter dated to you April 2, 1997, please be advised that
the Sandy Service Center under your claim 44 0997 907 has paid
the sum of $5,000 in medical expenses on your behalf.
Unless we hear from you or your legal representative within the
next 30 days, we will assume that you are satisfied with the
handling of your claim, and we will close our file.
Sincerely,

Felix Jensen
Claim Specialist
Phone: (801) 956-4011
State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company
FJ/es 014/0818024

ADDENDUM D
i

(

4

<

M rp

SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM #6084
211 East 300 South, #216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 3 64-163 3

•'-TY

Attorney for Plaintiff

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

NANA PENROSE,

FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED
COMPLAINT AND DEMAND FOR
JURY TRIAL

Plaintiff,
vs.

Civil No. 000909391 PI

CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL,
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FORMERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1 ) , DOES
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF
PLAINTIFF
Defendants.

Judge: L.A. DEVER

COMES NOW the Plaintiff, Nana Penrose, and by and through her
attorney,

Scott

N.

Cunningham,

and

hereby

amends

her

original

Verified Complaint and alleges and complains against the Defendants
as follows:
JURISDICTION AND VENUE
1.

At all times relevant herein, the Plaintiff was a resident

of Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
2.

At all times relevant herein, Defendants Christopher Ross,

and Bryant Ross (formerly identified as DOE 1 in plaintiff's
original Verified Complaint) were residents of Salt Lake County,
State of Utah. The true names and capacities, whether
1

individual

or otherwise, of defendants DOES 2-5, inclusive, are unknown to
plaintiff who therefore sues said defendants by such fictitious
names pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rules 9(a) (2) and
10 • Plaintiff will seek leave to amend this Complaint to show their
true names and capacities when the same have been ascertained.
Plaintiff is informed and believes and thereon alleges that at all
times herein mentioned each of the defendants were agents, servants
and employees of each of the remaining defendants and in so doing
the things hereinafter mentioned were acting within the course and
scope of such agency, service and employment and in doing the acts
herein alleged were acting with the consent, permission, knowledge

i

and authorization of each of the remaining defendants. All actions
of each such defendant were ratified and approved by the officers,
supervisors, or managing agents of every other defendant. Plaintiff

<

is informed and believes, and thereon alleges, that each of the
defendants designated herein as a DOE whose name is unknown is
negligently responsible in some manner for the events and

<

happenings herein referred to, and negligently caused the injuries
and damages to plaintiff as alleged herein.
3. The facts and circumstances giving rise to this litigation

i

occurred in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. The amount in
controversy exceeds $25,000.00, exclusive of costs. Jurisdiction
and venue are proper in this Court.

<

FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS
4.

All of the actions and events (hereinafter referred to as

i

2
A

"the accident") of which complaint herein is made occurred on the
21st day of November, 1996 (hereinafter referred to as "the time
of the accident").
5. At the time of the accident Plaintiff was the owner of and
operator of a certain automobile, operating upon the highways of
Salt Lake County in conformity with all traffic regulations and
responsibilities for the operation of said motor vehicle.
6.

At the time of the accident, Defendant Christopher Ross,

was the owner of and Defendant Bryant Ross (formerly identified
as DOE 1 in Plaintiff's original Verified Complaint) was operating
a certain automobile upon the highways of Salt Lake County, State
of Utah, and did so in such a manner as to become the proximate
cause of an accident between his motor vehicle and that of the
Plaintiff.
7.

At the time of the accident, Plaintiff was travelling

southbound on 900 East Street at approximately 850 South, in Salt
Lake City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah.
8.

At the time of the accident, Defendant Bryant Ross

(formerly identified as DOE 1 in Plaintiff's original Verified
Complaint) and DOES 2-5 were travelling East in the aforesaid
vehicle exiting the parking lot of Smith's Food and Drug store
located at 876 East 800 South onto 900 East Street in Salt Lake
City, County of Salt Lake, State of Utah. Defendant Bryant Ross
(formerly identified as DOE 1 in Plaintiff's original Verified
Complaint) and DOES 2-5 did at said time and place, and in the
aforesaid vehicle, strike the Plaintiff's vehicle from the
3

passenger side*
9.

Defendant Bryant Ross (formerly identified as DOE 1 in

Plaintiff's original Verified Complaint) and DOES 2-5 were
negligent in the operation of the aforesaid vehicle in several
aspects, including, but not limited to, the following:
a. He failed to pay proper attention to existing and
changing traffic conditions;
b. He failed to look where he was going and, in fact, was

,

issued a traffic citation by the Salt Lake City Police Department
charging him with a violation of applicable traffic laws in
connection with the official investigation of the accident.

,

Plaintiff alleges upon information and belief that Defendant
Byrant Ross was required to pay a court imposed fine as a
result of the said traffic violation;

<

c. He failed to lower his speed according to the existing
and changing traffic conditions, with reckless disregard for the
safety and welfare of others upon the road; and

I

d. He otherwise drove and operated his automobile
improperly.
10.

The accident which occurred and the injuries which have

(

resulted to the Plaintiff are the proximate result of the
negligence of Defendant Bryant Ross (formerly identified as DOE 1
in Plaintiff's original Verified Complaint) and DOES 2-5, as a

(

result of those events hereinbefore described.
11.

As a proximate result of the Defendants' negligence, the

Plaintiff was injured. The Plaintiff sustained shock and injury to

^

4
i

her brain, central nervous system, and spine, in at least the
following particulars: neck, upper and lower back injuries, both
to her spinal column and to the muscles, tendons and connective
tissues, other whiplash-related injuries, and psychological and
emotional damage, and a broken bone in her hand. As a proximate
result of the negligence of Defendants, Plaintiff has sustained
severe and continuing bodily injuries, including permanent
impairment, which have caused her great pain and anguish of mind
and body, sleeplessness, nausea, headaches and dizziness, and will
continue to experience such loss and damage in the future to
Plaintiff's general damage, in an amount to be proven at the time
of trial in this action.
12.

As a further proximate result of the negligence of

the Defendants, Plaintiff was required to, and did employ
physicians for medical examinations and treatment, a chiropractor,
and a licensed massage therapist for the care and treatment of
these injuries, and did incur medical and incidental expenses in
the sum exceeding $3000.00 at present, and in an amount to be
proven at time of trial.
13.

As a further direct and proximate result of the

negligence of the Defendants, Plaintiff has incurred and will yet
incur further medical, chiropractic, massage and incidental
expenses for care and treatment of these injuries, the exact amount
of which is unknown at the present time. Plaintiff reserves the
right to amend the Complaint at any time to show these expenses,
or simply to show them at trial.
5

14.

As a further direct and proximate result of the

negligence of the Defendants, Plaintiff has incurred medical and
incidental expenses for physicians, a chiropractor, a massage
therapist, hospital services, x-rays, prescription drugs and
medicines, equipment, and other care in an amount to be proven at
trial.
15.

As a further direct and proximate result of the

negligence of Defendants, Plaintiff has been required to and did
expend great amounts of time travelling to and from various
medical, chiropractic, and massage treatments, and continues to
incur such loss, all to Plaintiff's damage in an amount to be
proven at time of trial.
16.

As a further direct and proximate result of the

negligence of the Defendants, Plaintiff has suffered pain,
emotional distress, permanent impairment, loss of enjoyment of life
and other general damages in an amount to be proven at time of
trial.
FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligence)
17.

Plaintiff incorporates by reference the allegations of

paragraphs 1 through 16 above.
18.

The negligence of the Defendants proximately caused

injuries and damages to Plaintiff as alleged above.
19.

Defendants are liable to the Plaintiff for damages in

such categories and amounts to be proven at trial. Plaintiff should
6

be awarded such damages as are proven at trial.
WHEREFORE, the Plaintiff prays for judgment against the
Defendants as follows:
1. For general damages in an amount to be proven at trial.
2. For medical and incidental expenses, both past and future,
in an amount to be proven at trial.
3.

For other economic and out-of-pocket damages in an amount

to be proven at trial.
4.

For prejudgment interest on the damages assessed by the

verdict of the jury, pursuant to Utah Code Annotated, 1953, Section
78-27-44, as amended, and postjudgment interest, and such other and
further relief as the court deems just and proper.
5. For a trial by jury, the fee for which is attached hereto.
6.

For costs of court.

7.

For such other and further relief as the Court may deem

appropriate.

Dated: December 27, 2000
SCOTT N. C U N N T N G H A M / ES^f.
Attorney for Plaintiff

Plaintiff's attorney:
Scott N. Cunningham
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
7

VERIFICATION UNDER OATH

STATE OF UTAH

)

County of Salt Lake )

ss.

Nana Penrose, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes and
says that she is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter and
has read the foregoing FIRST AMENDED VERIFIED COMPLAINT FOR
NEGLIGENCE and knows the contents thereof and the same are true of
her own knowledge except as to those matters herein stated upon
information and belief, and as to those matters, she believes them
to be true.

DATED this

A

day of

3 q O U f l f V , 2001.

O

yjanagj

J-I^VI&LJLJ

NANA^PENROSE - Plaintiff

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me th

xL

0S\JU12LU

f

.

ntsL day of
i s oc

2001,

«^rf*hrfk^Mflbrf»«aki

AMBER N.MAYNE
Notary Pubic
State of Utah
_ , Oomm. &p*w Sep !7,W>4
*11fL»)S.Ste3l*ajCUTB41lH
9 h n r v w

JL/HJOUY).
NOTARY PUBLIC
Residing at Salt Lake' County,
Utah

<54K>k
8
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ADDENDUM E

Served C k > / » - / ^ ^ o* tfff^c,
SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM (6084)
211 East 300 South, #216
Salt Lake City, Utah 8<01li7; !
Telephone: (801) 364-1663

Address &M&fii4tmDv,
Oate
f -JCLA/ , a QQ\
Server

^ j * * ? L*

?Jc\\x4-

fff/^Jf,

Attorney for Plaintiff ^
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

NANA PENROSE,

FIRST AMENDED SUMMONS

Plaintiff,
vs.
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL,
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FORMERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1 ) , DOES
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF

Civil NO. 000909391 PI

Judge: L.A. DEVER

Defendants.

THE STATE OF UTAH TO THE ABOVE-NAMED DEFENDANTS:
You are hereby summoned and required to file an Answer in
writing to the attached First Amended Verified Complaint with the
Clerk of the Third Judicial District Court, located at 450 South
State Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 and serve upon, or mail
to, Scott N. Cunningham, Attorney for the Plaintiff, 211 East 300
South, #216, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, a copy of said Answer
within twenty (20) days after service of this First Amended Summons
upon you.
If you fail to do so, judgment by default will be taken
against you for the relief demanded in said First Amended Verified

RETURN OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF
1.
2.

Qq/T

Lark*?

01.!.

)

I hereby make return of service and certify the following:
C V__
I am a person over the age of 21 years, and am not a party to the action.
I served C ¥\Y I »14 if ii O
() Other
/

K0$}

..„._..

^Defendant, ()Plaintiff, () Witness,

Type of Process:
a.
(^Summons and Complaint
b.
( ) Petition to Modify
c.
(V) ;Order
\JIUCI to
IUShow
aiiuw Cause
^au&c
d.
e.

toOto^firti

kfflWtlt/

AL.,

en in nrnr^cc n v

Zlth0hitf£

A/A't£-'fi

"

I served said process by:
a.
6# Delivering a com: to Said individual personally at

7

c.

1 , x>& PiffiMf- [>riu.

() Leaving a copy with
a person of
JaW
L^Ki.Cih,
Uftih
—the person being
suitable\nncr
ageoand
discretion
at
the
above
address
for
served.
m m r iiritVi
V
( ) Serving a company or corporation:
by leaving
a copy with
whose title is
.

5.

Date Received: ^

J * A / , QLMI

Date Served: %J(IA/4

SjOO\

6.

Before serving said process, I endorsed the following information in the upper right-hand
Corner of the Summons and showed the original to the person being served:
a.
the name of the person being served,
b.
the date the same was served,
c.
the address of service,
d.
my name, and
e.
my signature.

7.

Case No. OOVWH
M 1 ^X
Service Fees:
*L\<V0
I certify that the foregoing is true and correct and that this certificate is executed on the
<f day of At^JfMr/?/
.2001
Process Server

Subscribed and Sworn to before this

ff^dav

Notafy Public

'e^^ma-Pi

r\

.2001

RETURN OF SERVICE
STATE OF UTAH

COUNTY OF
1.

KJ<XIT

LG(.K?

)

I hereby make return of service and certify the following:
I am a person over the age of 21 years, and am not a party to the action.

2.

I served $ry(Ltf4
/
( ) Other

3.

Type of Process:
a.
(tf Summons and Complaint
b.
0 Petition to Modify
c.
( ) Order to Show Cause

e.'
4.

fo$>

_rtjpefendant, ()Plaintiff, () Witness,
?

^Oth^^^^/ fjMt^JeJ

^yk/ptdir/^

I served said process by:
a.
(tf Delivering a copyjo Said individual personally at

teWXfipTWfyP<Cf
J<r// Wc> trtw. tffqTT

b.

5.

( ) Leaving a copy with
V /
a person of
suitable age and discretion at the above address for the person being served.
c.
( ) Serving a company or corporation:
by leaving
a copy with
whose title is
.
Date Received:
Date Served:

6.

Before serving said process, I endorsed the following information in the upper right-hand
Corner of the Summons and showed the original to the person being served:
a.
the name of the person being served,
b.
the date the same was served,
c.
the address of service,
d.
my name, and
e.
my signature.

7.

Case No. 0 QV°\ V°{ 2> °i f f t
Service Fees: £ * W
I certify that the foregoing is true and correct and that this certificate is executed on the
_ 1 _ day of J^kJlftf
. 2001
Process Server

Subscribed and Sworn to before this JfZHday
of
__oay ot
Notary Public

yQcl/u^*.^^\
g - ^ a ^

_^
"\

. 2001

ADDENDUM F

Richard K. Glauser, #4324
Michael W. Wright, #6153
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
Parkview Plaza
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801)466-4228

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

NANA PENROSE,

]

Plaintiff,
v.

'

CHRISTOPHER ROSS, an individual,
BRYANT ROSS, an individual, and Does
2-5, inclusive, whose true names are not
known to Plaintiff.
Defendants.

i
J)
]
j
]
]
)
I
]

DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS'S
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 000909391
Judge L.A. Dever

(

Defendant Bryant Ross, through his counsel of record, respectfully moves the court
for summary judgment dismissing all claims alleged against him by Plaintiff Nana Penrose.
This motion is based upon the following facts, grounds and circumstances:
1. The accident underlying this complaint occurred on November 21,1996, in Salt
Lake City, Utah;

<

2. Plaintiff filed her complaint against Defendant Bryant Ross on or about January
2,2001;
i
1

3. The statute of limitation governing this action is four years;
4. Defendant Bryant Ross alleged in the answer to his complaint that the cause of
action against him was barred by the applicable statute of limitations;
5. This provides him with a complete defense to this action; and,
6. For such other reasons as are set out in the accompanying memorandum of law.
Wherefore Defendant Bryant Ross prays that the court grant his motion for
summary judgment, that it dismiss all claims against him, and that he be granted such
other relief as is just and equitable in the circumstances.

Dated this _j£5day of

flUsj

2001.
Smith & Glauser

f]
yttccAAzsLj cJ/u4%C
Richard K. Glauser/y
Michael W. Wrigrff*"'

Certificate of Service
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage
pre-paid, this

">>

day of May 8, 2001, to:

Scott N. Cunningham
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Richard K. Glauser, #4324
Michael W.Wright, #6153
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.
Attorneys for Defendant
Parkview Plaza
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
(801)466-4228

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

NANA PENROSE,

]

Plaintiff,

;)
v.
)
)
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, an individual,
;
BRYANT ROSS, an individual, and Does ;
2-5, inclusive, whose true names are not ]
known to Plaintiff.
)
Defendants.
]I

DEFENDANT CHRISTOPHER ROSS'S
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No. 000909391
Judge L.A. Dever

Christopher Ross, by and through his undersigned counsel or record, respectfully
submits the following memorandum of law in support of his motion for summary judgment.
Statement of Undisputed Facts
1. The case is based upon an automobile accident which occurred on November
23, 1996 in Salt Lake City, Utah. (Complaint and Amended Complaint)
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2. Plaintiff filed her first complaint in this matter on or about November 17, 2000
alleging that Defendant Christopher Ross was operating the vehicle which collided with
hers. (Complaint)
3. On January 2, 2001 Plaintiff amended her complaint to name Bryant Ross as a
defendant, alleging that he was driving the vehicle which collided with hers. (Amended
Complaint)
4. The amended complaint alleges that Defendant Christopher Ross was the owner
of the vehicle that struck her on November 23, 1996, but does not allege that he was
driving the vehicle at the time of the accident. (Amended Complaint)
5. Defendant Christopher Ross was not driving the vehicle at the time of the
accident. (Affidavit of Christopher Ross)
Argument
The Owner of an Automobile is not Liable
for the negligence of the driver of the automobile.
When Plaintiff initiated this action, she began by asserting that Mr. Christopher Ross
was the driver of the other vehicle that collided with hers in November of 1996, and that
the collision resulted from his negligent operation of the vehicle. Subsequently, Plaintiff
determined that this was not the case, and she amended her complaint to name the
individual who was actually operating the vehicle at the time of the collision. Unfortunately,
she did not dismiss this defendant from the action at that time, instead she simply stated
that he was liable because he owned the subject vehicle.
It is a matter of well-established law that an owner of a vehicle is not liable for the
negligent operation of that vehicle by another individual, unless there are other

2

extraordinary circumstances. Lanev.MesserlW

P.2d (Utah 1986). The most common

of these occur when the owner entrusts his automobile to one who is intoxicated or who
is known to the owner to be an unsafe driver. In those cases, the owner is deemed to be
negligent because he has allowed his automobile to be used by an individual who is likely
to cause harm to others. Similarly, owners have been held to be susceptible to causes of
action sounding in negligence if they allow others to use an automobile which was in
obvious disrepair. See generally, 60A CJ.S. Motor Vehicles §428, etseq.
In this case, nothing of this sort has been alleged, and without a basis for
predicating liability on Mr. Christopher Ross, the court should grant his motion for judgment
as a matter of law, and dismiss all outstanding causes of action against him.
DATED this Jfi

day of

/JJ^^JL

,2001.

Smith & Glauser
, r / / i / / ; £cMf
iichaTd K. Glause
Richard
Michael W. Wrigh
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Certificate of Service
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed, postage
pre-paid, this «?*?
day of August, 2001 to:
Scott N. Cunningham
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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RICHARD K. GLAUSER (4324)
MICHAEL W. WRIGHT (6153 )
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.
Parkview Plaza
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
(801)466-4228
Attorneys for Defendant
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
NANA PENROSE,
)
])
]

Plaintiff,
v.

CHRISTOPHER ROSS, an individual and ]
Does 1-5, inclusive, whose true names are]
not known to Plaintiff.
]I
Defendants.

STATE OF UTAH

)I

AFFIDAVIT OF DEFENDANT
CHRISTOPHER ROSS

Civil No.: 000909391
Judge L.A. Dever

)
: ss.

COUNTY OF SALT LAKE

)

I, Christopher Ross, being first duly sworn upon oath, depose and state as
follows:
1.

I am the Defendant in this matter, I have received and reviewed the
complaint filed by Plaintiff and am familiar with the allegations contained
therein; and, I have first hand knowledge of the facts set out in this affidavit
and am competent to testify to the matters stated herein;

2.

At the time of the accident identified in Plaintiffs complaint, I was the owner
of a red 1989 Honda Accord, VIN JHMCA5539KC076925;

3.

This automobile was involved in a collision with Plaintiff, however, I was not
driving the vehicle at the time the accident occurred nor was I a passenger
or otherwise present in the vehicle when the accident occurred;

4.

My son Bryant Ross told me that he was driving the vehicle in question when
the accident occurred, a fact which is reflected in and corroborated by the
\

official accident report composed by the investigating officer in this matter;
(A copy of the report is attached to this affidavit as Exhibit A)
FURTHER, AFFIANT SAYETH NOT.
DATED this

5

day of January, 200/T

CTfRISTOPHER^ROSS

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this

NoCByPubUo

«*"••••«

5

day January, 2001.

CJesrirtJL

T

4J&AUA
/^K>7

NOTARY PUBLIC

I

t/
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^JSSS?*^" *
*n*m.me

I
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was mailed,
postage pre-paid, this

O

day of January 5, 2001, to:

Scott N. Cunningham
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM #6084
Attorney for Plaintiff
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 801 364-1663

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY - SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

NANA G. PENROSE,

:

:

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
OPPOSITION TO DEFENDANT BRYANT
ROSS'MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

:

Civil No. 000909391

:
PLAINTIFF,
-vs-

CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL,:
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FORMERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1), DOES :
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF,
DEFENDANTS.

Judge: L.A. DEVER

:

COMES NOW the plaintiff, Nana Penrose, through her attorney, and submits the
following Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support of Opposition to Defendant Bryant
Ross' Motion for Summary Judgment.
STATEMENT OF GENUINE ISSUES
This is an automobile accident case. Genuine issues of fact exist with respect to whether
defendant Bryant Ross negligently operated a vehicle causing a collision with plaintiffs vehicle
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thereby proximately causing injuries to her and other damages.
Plaintiff originally named Christopher Ross as a defendant, and sued defendant Bryant
Ross under the fictitious name of DOE 1, because she did not know his name. Her complaint
was filed within the four-year statute of limitations. Upon learning Bryant Ross' true identity,
plaintiff filed an amended complaint some one and one half months following the filing of her
original complaint, substituting his name for DOE: 1. In the time between the filing of the
original and amended complaints, the statute of limitations had expired. Defendants Ross were
timely served with the amended complaint.
Defendant Bryant Ross argues that plaintiff has amended her complaint to add a new
party, and that the new party was added after the statute of limitations had expired. This flies in
the face of Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 9(a)(2) which clearly allows a party to be sued
from the start of an action but under a fictitious name. What would the point of that provision be
if defendant's argument was valid? Defendant Bryant Ross then seems to acknowledge the
nature and effect of the provisions of Rule 9 (Defendant's Memorandum at p.5, para. 2, last
sentence), but argues that although plaintiff actually knew Bryant Ross' name, she somehow did
not list him by name as a defendant in her original complaint, and therefore cannot take
advantage of the provisions of Rule 9, URCP.
Therefore, it appears that a genuine issue exists as to whether plaintiff "knew" Byrant
Ross' name at the time she filed her original complaint.
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS
1.

This case arises out of an automobile accident involving plaintiff which occurred

in Salt Lake City, Utah on November 26, 1996. (Verified Complaint, attached as exhibit A)

2.

On the date plaintiff filed her original Verified Complaint herein (hereinafter

"original complaint"), November 17, 2001, plaintifTdid not know the name of the individual
Bryant Ross. (Original Complaint, attached as exhibit A; Affidavit of Nana G. Penrose in
Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter "plaintiffs affidavit", filed
herewith). See defendant Ross' Undisputed Fact Number 4. The moving defendant is relying
upon information and records which have never been a part of the records in this action in order
to bring the present motion, which is not in accordance with Rule 4-501 (2 )(a). See Plaintiffs
Objection to Defendant's Exhibits in Support of Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter
"plaintiffs objection to exhibits", filed herewith. In addition to Christopher Ross, plaintiff sued
persons whose true identities were unknown to her under the fictitious names of DOES 1-5, and
stated that those persons, along with Christopher Ross were negligently responsible for her
injuries and damages. This was done in accordance with Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule
9 (a)(2). (Original Complaint)
3.

Plaintiff had never received a copy of the Police Report regarding the accident

until defendant's counsel provided it to plaintiffs counsel in January, 2001. (Affidavit of Nana
G. Penrose in Support of Opposition to Motion for Summary Judgment, hereinafter "plaintiffs
affidavit", filed herewith). See movant's Undisputed Fact Number 4. Because plaintiff did not
know Bryant Ross' name, attempts to obtain a copy of the accident report from the police
department by plaintiffs counsel were unsuccessful. (Plaintiffs Affidavit)
4.

Plaintiff gave a recorded statement regarding the accident in April, 1997, but

never received a copy of that statement. (Plaintiffs Affidavit) See movant's Undisputed Fact
Number 4. See also Plaintiffs Objection to Exhibits filed herewith. Although the person taking
3

the statement apparently mentioned the name Bryant Ross during that interview, his name was
mentioned only once in passing along with other information about the accident, and plaintiff
did not remember it some three and one half years later when she signed her original complaint.
(Plaintiffs Complaint, attached as exhibit A; Plaintiffs Affidavit)
5.

The only name plaintiff knew of regarding the accident at the time she signed her

original complaint was Christopher Ross, whose name she knew because it was set forth in a
1997 letter from an insurance company, in which Christopher Ross was the only person listed as
"our insured". (Plaintiffs Affidavit, exhibit A thereto) See movant's Undisputed fact Number 4.
6.

Following service of plaintiff s original complaint upon Christopher Ross, on

December 18, 2000, plaintiffs counsel received a recorded telephone message from defendant
Christopher Ross saying that it was his son Bryant Ross who was involved in the accident. On
January 2, 2001, pursuant to Rule 9 (a)(2), URCP, having learned of the true identity of the
person previously designated as DOE 1 in plaintiffs original complaint, plaintiff filed her First
Amended Verified Complaint in which the name of Bryant Ross was substituted for the
fictitious name DOE 1. (Plaintiffs First Amended Verified Complaint, hereinafter Amended
Complaint, attached hereto as exhibit B). See movant's Undisputed Fact Number 3.
7.

Defendants Bryant Ross and Christopher Ross were both served with the

Amended Complaint at the Ross' home on January 8, 2001. (Return of Service, attached hereto
as exhibit C)
8.

On January 22, 2001, Defendants Ross filed their Answer to the Amended

Complaint.
9.

The parties have made their Initial Disclosures and the Stipulated Discovery Plan
4

and Order has been signed and entered herein. (Filed herein)
DISPUTED FACTS
10.

Plaintiff disputes that her initial complaint was filed on November 17, 2001. It

was filed on November 17, 2000. See defendant's Undisputed fact Number 2. (Complaint)
11.

Plaintiff disputes that portion of defendant's Undisputed Fact Number 3, wherein

it is stated that by filing her Amended Complaint she "attempted" to substitute the name of
Bryant Ross for one of the Doe defendants. Plaintiff did, in fact, substitute Bryant Ross' name
for Doe 1. (Amended Complaint)
12.

Plaintiff disputes defendant's Undisputed Fact Number 4. Plaintiff did not know

that Bryant Ross was the driver of the other vehicle that was involved in the accident on or
before she filed her original complaint on November 17, 2000. If she had known that
information, she would have named Bryant Ross as a defendant in her original complaint.
(Complaint, plaintiffs affidavit) Although it is not even the relevant standard, plaintiff also
disputes that she had reason to know Bryant Ross' name at that time. Following the accident
Plaintiff was disoriented and had two broken bones in her hand was taken from the scene of the
accident to an emergency room in an ambulance. She had not seen the police report or the
transcript of her statement made in April of 1997, in which Bryant Ross' name was mentioned
once. (Plaintiffs affidavit)

The only written information she had with any potential

defendant's name on it was a letter from 1997 which referred to Christopher Ross as the
insurance company's insured. (Plaintiffs affidavit, exhibit A thereto)

5

I
ARGUMENT
A DEFENDANT DESIGNATED BY A FICTITIOUS NAME PURSUANT TO UTAH
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, RULE 9(a)(2) IS CONSIDERED TO BE A PARTY TO
THE ACTION FROM THE DATE THE ORIGINAL ACTION WAS FILED
URCP Rule 9(a)(2) provides:
"Designation of unknown defendant. When a party does not know the name of an
adverse party, he may state that fact in the pleadings, and thereupon such adverse
party may be designated in any pleading or proceeding by any name; provided
that when the true name of such adverse party is ascertained, the pleading or
proceeding must be amended accordingly."
This is precisely what plaintiff did in this case. When plaintiff learned defendant Bryant
Ross? name, she amended her complaint to substitute Bryant Ross' true name for the fictitious
name DOE 1. Pursuant to Rule 9, this was not adding a new party, but was properly identifying
an existing party whose name was not known to plaintiff and who was sued in the original
complaint under a fictitious name within the time allowed by the applicable statute of
limitations. No Utah case was found which discussed this particular provision. Several
California cases discussing California Code of Civil Procedure Section 474, "Defendant
Designated by Fictitious Name" state the effect of the rule. A copy of that statute is attached
hereto as exhibit D. A defendant who was designated by a fictitious name and whose true name
was later discovered and substituted by amendment is considered to have been a party to the
action from the date the original complaint wasfiled.Garrett v. Crown Coach Corp. (1968) 66
Cal.Rptr. 590, 259 C.A.2d 647; California State Auto Ass'n.. Inter-Ins. Bureau v. Cohen (1975)
118 Cal.Rptr. 890, 44 C.A.3d 387; Snoke v. Bolen (App. 1 Dist. 1991) 1 Cal.Rptr.2d 492, 235
Cal.App.3d 1427; Balon v. Drost (App. 1 Dist. 1991) 25 Cal.Rptr,2d 12, 20 Cal. App.4th 483.

6

II
PLAINTIFF'S DESIGNATION OF DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS BY A FICTITIOUS
NAME IN HER ORIGINAL COMPLAINT WAS PROPER BECAUSE SHE DID NOT
KNOW HIS NAME
First of all, had plaintiff known Bryant Ross' name at the time she signed and filed her
original complaint, she would have specifically named him as a defendant using his real name.

If plaintiff really even "caught" that name when it was quickly mentioned one time by an
insurance adjuster in April of 1997 (along with many other facts regarding the accident) she did
not remember it more than three and one half years later when she filed her original complaint.
(Following the accident, plaintiff had two broken bones in her hand and was disoriented and was
taken by ambulance to the hospital.)
Plaintiff did not have a copy of the police report until it was provided by counsel for
defendants after the filing of the original complaint. Although an attempt was made to obtain the
report prior tofilingthe original complaint (plaintiffs affidavit, filed herewith), the police
department could not locate the report, probably because plaintiff did not know Bryant Ross'
name in order to ask for a report involving him.
Even if plaintiff can be said to have known the name of Bryant Ross back in early 1997,
and she later forgot it (or was confused or mislead, see below), her later lack of knowledge of his
name was real and not feigned. A California case considering a similar issue held that the
plaintiffs conduct in forgetting the name of the other driver involved in an accident
demonstrated carelessness, not willful misuse of the Code of Civil Procedure provision
authorizing plaintiff, who was ignorant of the name of the party responsible for causing
7

damages, to name ^Doe" defendants, and thereby comply with the statute of limitations. Balon
v. Drost (App. 1 Dist. 1993) 25 Cal.Rptr.2d 12, 20 Cal.App. 4th 483.
Additionally, the only written information plaintiff had in her possession regarding any
potential defendant at the time she filed her original complaint was a letter dated August 1997
from an insurance company which listed Christopher Ross as their insured. This was potentially
misleading because Bryant Ross is also insured by that company and no mention was made of
him.

.in
EVEN IF PLAINTIFF CANNOT BE SAID TO HAVE "NOT KNOWN" BRYANT ROSS'
NAME WHEN SHE FILED HER ORIGINAL COMPLAINT, THE AMENDED
COMPLAINT SHOULD BE CONSIDERED TO RELATE BACK TO THE ORIGINAL
COMPLAINT
The relation back doctrine is governed by Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 15(c),
which provides that "whenever the claim or defense asserted in the amended pleading arose out
of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set forth or attempted to be set forth in the original
pleading, the amendment relates back to the date of the original pleading" Utah R. Civ. P.
15(c).
While generally Rule 15(c) will not apply to an amendment which substitutes or adds
new parties for those brought before the court by the original pleadings, the Utah Supreme Court
has made an exception to the general rule. The exception operates where there is a relation back,
as to both plaintiff and defendant, when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can
be assumed or proved that relation back is not prejudicial. Sulzen v. Williams. 977 P.2d 497,
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quoting Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp., 911 P.2d 367, 369 (Utah 1996). Parties have an identity
of interest when "the real parties in interest were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were
involved in them unofficially, from an early stage." Suizen, 977 P.2d at 501 (quoting DoxevLavton Co. v. Clark. 548 P.2d 902, 906 (Utah 1976). The rationale underpinning the identity of
interest exception is one which obstructs a mechanical use of a statute of limitations; to prevent
adjudication of a claim. Id At 501.
In the present case, Christopher Ross, who was served with the original complaint, is the
father of Bryant Ross, who was later served at the same residence where Christopher Ross was
originally served. Certainly these parties have an identity of interest when the real party in
interest, Bryant Ross, can be reasonably assumed to have been alerted to the proceedings, or was
involved in them unofficially from an early stage. In Russell v. Standard Corp., 898 P.2d 263,
265 (Utah 1995) the Court noted that identity of interest exists when existing parties and those
sought to be added are so closely related that notice of the action against one serves to provide
notice of the action to the other. In this case, given the identity of interest between Christopher
and Bryant Ross, and the short period between the filing of the original complaint and the
amended complaint, there is very little likelihood that any prejudice could have occurred to
defendant Bryant Ross as a result of the amendment. The parties hereto have made their Initial
Disclosures and stipulated to a discovery plan.
Therefore the amendment should be considered to relate back to the date of thefilingof
the original complaint which was made prior to the running of the statute of limitations.

9

CONCLUSION
Plaintiff honestly did not know Bryant Ross' name at the time she filed her original
complaint herein. Plaintiff made proper use of the provisions of Rule 9(a)(2) URCP in
designating him as a defendant by a fictitious name, and later amended to substitute his true
name once it was learned. He was not added as a new party by amendment, but was a party to
the action from the filing of the original complaint. Even if plaintiff "knew" Bryant Ross' name
years before and later forgot it, her use of Rule 9(a)(2) was still proper, as she in good faith
really could not remember his name when she filed her original complaint.
If the Court were to find that plaintiffs use of Rule 9(a)(2) was improper, plaintiffs
amended complaint should nevertheless relate back to the date of the filing of the original
complaint based upon Rule 15(c)'s relation back doctrine and the "identity of interest"
exception. For all of the above reasons, plaintiff respectfully submits that defendant's motion
should be denied, and that plaintiff be allowed her day in court with the responsible party for an
adjudication of her claim on the merits.
Datedthis

day of May, 2001.

Scott N. Cunningham
Attorney for Plaintiff Nana Penrose

id

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this^/^p

day of May, 2001,1 mailed a true and correct copy of

the foregoing MEMORANDUM OF POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN OPPOSITION TO
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to:
Michael W. Wright
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

Ls***^-*i*si~f.
"*^A*
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SCOTT N.CUNNINGHAM #6084
Attorney for Plaintiff
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 801 364-1663

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY - SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

NANA G.PENROSE,
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR HEARING
ON DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
PLAINTIFF,

Civil No. 000909391

-vsCHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL,
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FORMERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1), DOES
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF,

Judge: L.A. DEVER

DEFENDANTS.

COMES NOW plaintiff Nana G. Penrose, by and through her attorney, and pursuant to
Code of Judicial Administration, Rule 4-501 (3)(b), respectfully requests that the Court set date
and time for a hearing on Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary Judgment.

Dated this fjf / ^day of May, 2001.

*>>?/£

Scott N. Cunningham
Attorney for Plaintiff Nana G. Penrose

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on t h i s / f f

day of May, 2001,1 mailed a true and correct copy of

the foregoing REQUEST FOR HEARING ON DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS' MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT to:
Michael W. Wright
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

•
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ADDENDUM I

SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM #6084
Attorney for Plaintiff
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 801 364-1663

0; JUH-5 Fii

IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY - SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

NANA G. PENROSE,

:

PLAINTIFF'S MEMORANDUM OF
POINTS AND AUTHORITIES IN
RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT BRYANT
ROSS' REPLY MEMORANDUM IN
SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

:

Civil No. 000909391

PLAINTIFF,

-vs-

CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL,:
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FORMERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1), DOES :
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF,

Judge: L.A. DEVER

DEFENDANTS.

Plaintiff Nana Penrose, by and through her counsel, Scott N. Cunningham, hereby
submits the following Response to Defendant Bryant Ross' Reply Memorandum in order to
correctly inform this Court of blatantly misleading statements regarding Utah case law
set forth in Defendant's Reply Memorandum.

i

ARGUMENT
The Utah cases dealing with the "identity of interest" exception to the rule that normally
an amendment to a pleading which adds a new party does not relate back to the date of the
original filing have held that the primary focus of the inquiry is on whether the parties have a
sufficiently close relationship to one another to justify the conclusion that notice to one serves as
notice to the other. The key is notice, and consequently a lack of prejudice. The cases cited by
plaintiff in her Memorandum in Opposition to defendant's motion set this forth accurately and
by direct quotes from those cases. Defendant's only response to that on point case law is to
attempt to add further requirements to those holdings which those courts simply did not state:
defendant states that "...a closer review of the cases dealing with the unity of interest question
shows that the criteria for finding such a unity require more than just close personal
relationship between the first party named and the party whose addition is sought." Defendant's
Reply Memo at p. 8. (Emphasis added) Defendant states that this has been the holdings of those
courts because of a recurring fact pattern in those cases that the old and new parties have a
common interest in the outcome of the litigation at hand.
First, not only is that not the holding of any of the cases cited by either party hereto, but
there is not even any mention of that issue in those cases. In Doxey-Layton Co. v. Clark, 548
P2d 902 (Utah 1976), the court set forth the criteria forfindingan "identity of interest" at page
906 of its opinion:
"The exception operates where there is a relation back, as to both plaintiff and
defendant, when new and old parties have an identity of interest; so it can be
assumed or proved the relation back is not prejudicial. The rationale underpinning

this is one which obstructs a mechanical use of a statute of limitations; to prevent
adjudication of a claim. Such is particularly valid, where, as here, the real parties in
interest were sufficiently alerted to the proceedings, or were involved in them
unofficially from an early stage." Id. at 906.
In Wilcox v. Geneva Rock Corp.. 911 P.2d 367 (Utah 1996), the Court quoted the above
holding in Doxev-Lavton. supra, as setting forth the applicable rule for finding that an "identity
of interest" exists, and that therefore the exception would apply. Wilcox. at p. 370. Again, the
crux of the determination is that the real parties in interest had notice of the proceedings (and
thus were not prejudiced). In Perry v. Pioneer Wholesale Supply Co., 681 P.2d 214 (Utah 1984),
the Court stated that: "Identity of interest as used in this context means that the parties are so
closely related in their business operations that notice of the action against one serves to provide
notice of the action to the other." Id. at p. 217. (Emphasis added). In Russell v. Standard Corp.,
898 P.2d 263 (Utah 1995) the Court again held that the requirement for finding identity of
interest is that the parties are so closely related that notice of the action against one serves to
provide notice to the other. Id. at p. 265. In Sulzen v. Williams , 977 P.2d 497 (Utah App. 1999)
the Court of Appeals quoted Wilcox, supra, which in turn had quoted Doxev-Lavton. supra, for
the rule set forth hereinabove in those cases.
The factor that those courts were looking for in each of those cases was notice to the real
party in interest (so that relation back of an amendment was not prejudicial).
Nowhere in any of the above-cited cases, or any case cited by defendant, is it held by any
court that a "common interest in the outcome of litigation at hand" is a requisite part of the
analysis. In fact, no mention of issue that is even made.
In the present case, Christopher Ross, who was served with the original

complaint, is the father of Bryant Ross, who was later served at the same residence where
Christopher Ross was originally served. Moreover, Christopher Ross knew that he had not
been involved in an accident such as was described in PlaintifFs original Complaint. And, being
that Bryant Ross was apparently seventeen years old at the time of the accident and was
hospitalized following the accident, and given that Bryant Ross was apparently insured under
Christopher Ross' policy (see Exhibit A to plaintiffs Declaration previously filed herein), it is
entirely reasonable to assume that Christopher Ross was aware that Bryant Ross had been
involved in the accident, and that he informed Bryant Ross of the Summons and Complaint that
Christopher Ross had been served with at their home. Therefore, not only did Bryant Ross
receive notice of plaintiff s action at that time, but it would have been clear that the action
related to the accident that Bryant had been in.
Bryant Ross "can be reasonably assumed to have been alerted to the proceedings, or was
involved in them unofficially from an early stage." No prejudice will result to Bryant Ross by
the relation back of plaintiffs Amended Complaint to the date of the original Complaint. Nor
has Bryant Ross even made the suggestion that he would be prejudiced in any way by a
relation back of the Amended Complaint. The time between the filing of the original
complaint and the amended complaint was only a little more than one month. Moreover,
Christopher Ross and Bryant Ross are insured by the same company, and therefore, the evidence
gathered by the insurer for each of the defendants Ross regarding the accident would be the
same. Additionally, these defendants both have the same attorneys, which further demonstrates
an identity of interest preventing prejudice from resulting.
On the other hand, plaintiff stands to lose her day in court for an adjudication upon the
merits against the young driver who she alleges hit her, causing her to suffer, as plaintiff has

alleged in her verified pleadings, broken bones, a trip to the hospital, and permanent injury. It
should be noted that the parties hereto have made their Initial Disclosures and stipulated to a
discovery plan which this Court has incorporated into an Order.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, plaintiff respectfully submits that this is a case which fits
within the "identity of interest" exception, and that a relation back, especially in light of the lack
of prejudice to Bryant Ross, should be recognized with the result that plaintiff will not be
deprived of her day in court.
Dated this j) ^ d a y of June, 2001.

^

;Scott N Cunningham
Attorney for Plaintiff Nana Penrose

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that on this ^ S i a y of June, 2001,1 mailed a true and correct copy of
the foregoing PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS' REPLY TO
PLAINTIFF'S RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT to:
Michael W. Wright
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106
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THIRD DISTRICT COURT SALT LAKE COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
PENROSE,
Plaintiff,

DEFT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
JUDGMENT

vs.

Case No: 000909391

CHRISTOPHER ROSS,
Defendant.

Judge: L. A. DEVER
Date: 09/6/2001

Clerk: debbiep
On order of Judge Dever, deft Bryant Ross Motion for Summary
Judgment is granted. Statue of Limitations has run. The use of
"John Doe" designation insufficient to preserve claim for reasons
noted in deft's memorandum. No identity of interest established,
c/o atty for deft to prepare an order for the court to sign.

Paqe 1

Case No: 000909391
Date:
Sep 10, 2001
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the
following people for case 000909391 by the method and on the date
specified.
METHOD
Mail

Mail

Dated this

|U

day of

^?fff

NAME
SCOTT N CUNNINGHAM
ATTORNEY PLA
211 East 300 South, #216
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111
MICHAEL W. WRIGHT
ATTORNEY DEF
2180 South 1300 E, Suite 600
SALT LAKE CITY UT 84106

- *oU_.

pr
Deputy Court Clerk

Page 2 (last)
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_F!LED_

SCOTT N. CUNNINGHAM #6084
Attorney for Plaintiff
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone 801 364-1663
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT - STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY - SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT

NANA G. PENROSE,
:
PLAINTIFF,
-vs-

:

CHRISTOPHER ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL,:
BRYANT ROSS, AN INDIVIDUAL (FORMERLY IDENTIFIED AS DOE 1), DOES :
2-5, INCLUSIVE, WHOSE TRUE NAMES
ARE NOT KNOWN TO PLAINTIFF,
DEFENDANTS.

PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTION TO
PROPOSED ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT BRYANT ROSS'
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
Civil No. 000909391

Judge: L.A. DEVER

:

Plaintiff, Nana Penrose, by and through her counsel, Scott N. Cunningham,
hereby objects to the Proposed "Order Granting Defendant Bryant Ross' Motion for Summary
Judgment and Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law" as prepared by counsel for Defendant
in the above-captioned case on the following basis: The Court's ruling per the Minute Entry
dated September 6,2001, dealt with two issues: on the first issue, the Court's ruling was that the
use of the John Doe designation was insufficient to preserve the claim against Bryant Ross. But
plaintiff had also argued that because she had amended her Complaint to include Bryant
Ross, the amendment adding a him as a defendant should relate back to the date of the

filing of the initial Complaint under the "identity of interest" exception to the rule that normally
an amendment adding a new party does not relate back in time. On plaintiffs argument for a
relation back based upon the exception, the Court specifically ruled that no identity of interest
had been established.
Because the Court ruled on the application of the "identity of interesf'exception, and in
fairness to plaintiff, the Order should state in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law that:
"The plaintiffs Amended Complaint does not relate back in time to the date of the filing
of plaintiff s initial Complaint because the amendment added a new party to the action,
and the "identity of interest" exception does not apply because no identity of interest was
established."

Further, the proposed order as drawn states in the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law at paragraph 3. that: "On January 2,2001, plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint
attempting to substitute the name of Bryant Ross for one of the Doe defendants." Plaintiff
objects to the language "attempting to substitute" because plaintiff did, in fact, amend her initial
Complaint to include the name Bryant Ross as a defendant in her First Amended Complaint, and
did not merely "attempt" to do so. Paragraph 3. should state that plaintiff amended her
Complaint to name Bryant Ross as a defendant instead of one of the Doe defendants.
For the same reason, Plaintiff objects to the language "attempted substitution" in paragraph 6. of
the proposed order. Paragraph 6. should state that "The amendment of plaintiff s Complaint
substituting Bryant Ross for one of the Doe defendants does not relate back in time to the
original filing of the Complaint. The 'identity of interest' exception does not apply because no
identity of interest was established."

Dated this 1st day of October, 2001.

Scott N. Cunningham
Attorney for Plaintiff

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I hereby certify that on October 1,2001,1 mailed a true and correct copy of the
foregoing Objection to Proposed Order to the following:
Michael W. Wright
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84106

>cott N. Cunningham

I
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RICHARD K. GLAUSER (4324)
MICHAEL W. WRIGHT (6153)
SMITH & GLAUSER, P.C.
A Professional Corporation
Parkview Plaza
2180 South 1300 East, Suite 600
Salt Lake City, UT 84106
Telephone: (801)466-4228
Facsimile: (801)466-6291
Attorneys for Defendants
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF UTAH
SALT LAKE COUNTY, SALT LAKE DEPARTMENT
NANA PENROSE,
Plaintiff,
v.
CHRISTOPHER ROSS, an individual,
BRYANT ROSS, an individual, and Does
2-5, inclusive, whose true names are not
known to Plaintiff.
Defendants.

ORDER GRANTING DEFENDANT,
BRYANT ROSS', MOTION FOR
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Civil No.: 000909391
Judge L.A. Dever

The defendant, Bryant Ross', Motion for Summary Judgment came before the
Court on its pleadings. The Court having considered the Motion and Memoranda in
support thereof, as well as, the Memorandum in Opposition to the Motion for Summary
Judgment and supplemental Memorandum in Opposition to Motion for Summary
Judgment, and the Court being well informed in the premises,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED and DECREED, that,
Defendant, Bryant Ross', Motion for Summary Judgment should be granted.
This judgment is made on the following Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

The accident underlying the Complaint occurred on November 21, 1996 in

Salt Lake City, Utah.
2.

Plaintiff filed an initial Complaint which named Christopher Ross and John

Does 1-5 as defendants to the action on November 17, 2000.
3.

On January 2, 2001, plaintiff filed her First Amended Complaint

attempting to substitute the name of Bryant Ross for one of the Doe defendants.
4.

As this is an action for personal injury, it must be brought within four years

of the date of the accident.
5.

Plaintiff failed to name defendant Bryant Ross within the four year period.

6.

The attempted substitution of Bryant Ross for one of the Doe defendant's

does not relate back in time to the original filing of the Complaint.
7.

Dismissal with prejudice of all cause of actions is the proper remedy for

failure to bring a timely claim.
DATED this

day of September, 2001.
BY THE COURT:

HONORABLE

0f

By
STAMP USED AT DIRECTION OF JUDGE

2

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE AND NOTICE
NOTICE:
Pursuant to Rule 4-504 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration, you are
hereby notified that defendant's counsel has forwarded the original hereof to the Court
for signature, and you have five (5) days from the date this notice is served upon you to
file any written objections to the form of the foregoing Order with the Court and mail a
copy to defendant's counsel. If no objections are filed within that time, the original
hereof will be signed and filed.
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANT, BRYANT ROSS', MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT was mailed,
postage pre-paid, this S>

day of September, 2001, to:

Scott N. Cunningham
211 East 300 South, Suite 216
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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Appellate jurisdiction.
Third party by defendant.
—Grounds.
Untimely motion to allow counterclaim.
Cited.
„ . . . .. ..
A
Appellate jurisdiction.
The final judgment rule, R.Civ.R 54(b), applies when the trial court orders a separate
trial of the claim, cross-claim, counterclaim, or
third-party claim, and failure to have the case
certified as final by the trial court, leaving
issues and parties before that court, will de.,
n ,
_xrJ-4.pnve the appellate court of jurisdiction over a n
appeal. First Sec. Bank v. Conlin, 817 P.2d 298
(Utah 1991)
Third party by defendant.
—Grounds.
If one named as a defendant tort-feasor
impleads another alleged joint tort-feasor, the
defendant in the initial action does so, not on
COLLATERAL
Am. Jur. 2d. — 59 Am. Jur. 2d Parties § 188
et seq.
C.J.S. — 67 C.J.S. Parties §§ 72 to 84.

J^fJulV^Xk-rxV^A^

the ground that a claim for relief then exists
against the third-party defendant, but on the
ground that the third-party defendant "may be
liable* to the defendant in the principal action.
Unigard Ins. Co. v. City of LaVerkin, 689 P.2d
1344 (Utah 1984).
Untimely motion

^

Mow

counterclaim.

T h e t r f a l CQurt d i d n o t a b u s e itg d i s c r e t i o n
den

^

^

motions

^ ^ ^

ft c o u n t e r c l a i m and

m
to

which were
^ com
filed
m o n t h g after a n
,.,
, .
i u r
^
£ 1 J
plaint was filed and two weeks before the
^ , , . , , . . , ,
,
r
^
sch du
* ^ t n f a l d a t e > w h e ' e reasons for the
untimely motion were inadequate and where
the parties failed to demonstrate that the
court's denial of the motions resulted in prejudice. Tripp v. Vaughn, 746 P.2d 794 (Utah Ct.
App

[R thM

de f e ndants

1987)

Cited in Serr v. Rick Jensen Constr., Inc.,
743 P.2d 1202 (Utah 1987).
REFERENCES
A.L.R. — Defendant's right to contribution or
indemnity from original tortfeasor, 20
A.L.R.4th 338.

Rule 15. Amended and supplemental pleadings,
(a) Amendments. A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course
at any time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one to
which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not been placed
upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time within 20 days after
it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his pleading only by leave of court
or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall be freely given when
justice so requires. A party shall plead in response to an amended pleading
within the time remaining for response to the original pleading or within 10
days after service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the
longer, unless the court otherwise orders.
(b) Amendments to conform to the evidence. When issues not raised by the
pleading are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, they shall be
treated in all respects as if they had been raised in the pleadings. Such
amendments of the pleadings as may be necessary to cause them to conform to
the evidence and to raise these issues may be made upon motion of any party
at any time, even after judgment; but failure so to amend does not affect the
result of the trial of these issues. If evidence is objected to at the trial on the
ground that it is not within the issues made by the pleadings, the court may
allow the pleadings to be amended when the presentation of the merits of the
action will be subserved thereby and the objecting party fails to satisfy the
court that the admission of such evidence would prejudice him in maintaining
his action or defense upon the merits. The court shall grant a continuance, if
necessary, to enable the objecting party to meet such evidence.
(c) Relation back of amendments. Whenever the claim or defense asserted in
the amended pleading arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set
forth or attempted to be set forth in the original pleading, the amendment
relates back to the date of the original pleading.

